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Introduction 
 
“Are power relations the primary engine in history? Are we anthropologists able to 
present a deeper understanding of this intricate and contradictory human process in its 
present ephemeral composition: the combined forms of domination, command, exploitation, 
and subordination? 
Should our primary goal be to make these forms of power visible to others, as a first 
step in social transformation? Can our analysis demythologize and make visible all current 
forms of human domination and exploitation in ways that would help to contribute to the 
search of more humanized forms of social power as part of our political engagement? 
Is this the kind of theoretical/social labor (in a kind of political epistemology perspective) 
toward which we should be working?” (Escalona Victoria, 2016: 259) 
 Trading and exchange of goods are not only playing more important role in human 
history, than their chapters in economic history books can imply and instantiate, but 
multifacetedly illustrating the relevance of Escalona Victoria’s questions, suggesting distinct 
answers. Prices and price-information can excellently serve this quest.  
Prices are regulating the market behavior, while price information generates the 
moment of decision making for every actor of the scene. 
In the mainstream history literature, the velocity and exclusivity of price information 
transmission is a source of merchants’ power: the higher the price, the greater their benefits. 
James R. Beniger’s brilliant book provides a sophisticated historical reconstruction of 
the 19th century paradigm shift: the rationalization of distributional control through different 
transition stages, like the factor/jobber system, new information platforms (Price Currents and 
early tele-distribution services), auction systems, fixed prices and price catalogs. „Better 
information, in short” as Beniger (1986:159) states, „meant better control of the 
distributional system by all actors involved”. 
 Nevertheless, the control of a distributional system does not equal with the control of 
the price making. The control of prices through price decisions is not inevitably equal with the 
control of price information flow. A price, no doubt, controls the behavior of the agents, but 
only in their particular sets of actions and only as a part of a special mix of controlling forces. 
Furthermore: what about the control mechanisms which influence the merchants themselves? 
What is the role of gathering information before shaping up given prices? How about the 
accidental and incremental control-generating power of prices after determining the 
transactions? Where is the beginning and the end of the entangled control cascade?  
It’s time for a cautious deconstruction of Beniger’s concept of control, as a “purposive 
influence toward a predetermined goal” (Beniger, 1986:7-8). In this vocabulary, influence is 
an “influence of one agent over another, meaning that the former causes changes in the 
behavior of the latter”; and Beniger use the purpose “in the sense that influence is directed 
toward some prior goal of the controlling agent”, in an ultracompetitive context. 
’Purposiveness’, ’predetermination’ and ’influence’ are important starting points, 
when we reconstruct the intentional side of an occurance, on a history stage, from a given 
actor’s point of view, focusing on separated sequences. But these concepts are very 
problematic, when we use them as core elements of a holistic explanatory framework, trying 
to understand change and emergence. They are only components of a more complex and more 
elastic space of causal historical explanations and interpretations, containing other (often 
involuntary) influencing factors.  
Interestingly, Beniger himself offers to use ‘control’ as a generalized concept, which 
“encompasses the entire range from absolute control to the weakest and most probabilistic 
form, that is, any purposive influence on behavior, however slight”, seceding from the  
more “determinate manifestations”, “approximate synonyms of influence” (direction, 
guidance, regulation, command, and domination), what Beniger call "strong control."  
The following considerations about pricing and price-information lead us to modify 
the “radius of validity” of Beniger’s concept of control, even if it is still the most heuristic 
approach to understand the 19th century origins of Information Society.   
Simultaneously, our approach provides an opportunity to have future information 
history research a great mind, when revisiting the place and importance of price-information 
in the all-time information ecosystem.  
 
Higher price, profit-maximization, programmable humans?  
 
“.. the factor served well as programmable controller, motivated 
by the fact that the higher the price he got for his planter's 
cotton, the greater his commission and commercial reputation”. 
(Beniger, 1986:136) 
  What is the role of a ‘commercial behavior’ in shaping (higher) prices? Are we sure, 
that being compelled “to gather market information, process it to make price predictions, and 
arrive at selling and buying decisions that maximized profits” (Beniger, 198:134) is the only 
reason to allocate time and energy for information seeking (i.e. to add the cost of getting 
price-information quickly to the overall expenditures)?1 Later, the officially/institutionally 
announced/transmitted price information (via newspaper sections, Price Currents, telegraph 
reports, etc.) are serving as tools for higher prices, as Beniger states?  
 In Beniger’s cybernetic vocabulary a factor (middleman, agent) is a subject of a direct 
command-control loop, and the ambiguities can be reduced by trust-asserting tools (like 
taking family members into the most important “hubs”) or through coercive solutions. “The 
factor was bound to obey any instructions given him” by an 1840 Supreme Court decision 
(Woodman, 1968:60). After the shift from the factor-system to the auction system, it served 
“not only to control the allocation of commercial goods but to smooth the transition from 
traditional face-to-face exchange to more rationalized forms of distribution” (Beniger, 
1986:159). Yet, the auction system and the culture of mediated, public price-information are 
not about higher prices but the stability and balance through improved controllability, 
transcending the disturbing lack of trust.  
 The result – in the second part of the 19th century – is the rationalization and 
advancement of distributional control, with the auctions, informational innovations of fixed 
prices and price catalogs, providing different benefits for different actors, generating different 
types of purposes: 
 
• For the jobber: possibility of much longer-range planning and hence market control  
• For the retailer: ability to make better estimations of purchases, eliminating 
uncertainties 
• For the manufacturer: “greater rationalization of commerce meant better planning of 
production and hence further stability of distribution … so that domestic 
manufacturers, like their foreign counterparts, naturally favored a more regularized 
and predictable means of disposing of their goods." (Beniger, 1986:159).   
                                                 
1 The most time-sensitive information was information related to market prices, and a time advantage in 
obtaining price information could be very profitable. Postal regulations designed to guarantee that the mail 
would travel faster than other sources of information were a direct result of arbitrage in commodity prices. 
(Brock, 2003:21). Focusing to the costs (the cost of using the price system, cost of acquiring information, 
negotiating etc. costs of any activity to use the price system) is the basis of the management-guided allocation 
paradigm (Demsetz, 1997). 
 By this time, the story is not simply about prices. There is a complete and complex 
market information ecosystem, where the successful adaptation depends on cooperation 
patterns, combined with disposability to follow common rules, regulations, and protocols. We 
are unable to form any usable model, reclining upon one-dimensional cybernetic 
interpretations. 
 
Beyond Beniger: layers of a multi-agent control structure 
 
We can anticipate this complexity of control forces, pars pro toto, in the lense of the 
“control mix” of price-making, too.   
Firstly, we need to make real the existing microverses of competing purposivenesses – 
knowledge on other actors’ positions are strongly determining the range of possibilities, pre-
forming the decisions, and trying to induce information asymmetries.2 So, the individual 
outputs are always vectors, and the resultants are constructed in a multiplayer space.3  
Secondly, we should always remember, that the decisions on prices are always only 
parts of the full financial control landscape, where the taxes, the interest rates, the monetary 
ambience, the momentary liquidity conditions, the insurance background, the perception of 
risks and previous experiences as off-transactional factors are also able to modify the 
considerations and hence the market behavior. 
Thirdly, there is a voluminous set of off-monetary control factors, when prices are 
forming: the features of shipment, packaging, storage, and their security aspects.  
 And finally, it is hard to underestimate the importance of hard (nature, social forge, 
institutions) and soft (fashion, ideologies, values) off-commercial factors.  
The results of Uebele, Grünebaum and Kopsidis (2013:26-27) amazingly illustrate 
these correspondences. Observing price elasticity in proto-industrialized Saxony between 
1790 and 1830, they found, that “demographic and socio-economic change was accompanied 
with defensive strategies by low income households to reduce the risk of hunger”. Storage 
                                                 
2 From a cybernetic point of view, it is easy to forget the counter-control forces. If there is no acceptance of outer 
meanings, and the only motivation is a higher price, people have lot of possibilities to resist from a simple 
withdrawal from the transactions to armed conflicts during hunger revolts. 
3 In the neoclassical economic theory, the whole resource allocation is price-guided, based on known 
technologies and prices by the actors (Demsetz, 1997). It does not mean, of course, that unknown elements are 
not parts of an overall control structure. 
decisions “were a mix of commercial and precautionary behavior”, based on both prices and 
harvest shocks – while prices were forcefully influenced by storage decisions.4 
Adams et. al (2011) could show that organisational form is an important determinant 
of the claims experience (of Swedish fire insurers), suggesting that “mutuality acts as an 
effective control for information asymmetries in the market”.5 
 
Figure 1. 
Control layers of Price-making 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 What could work in Saxony, did not work in England in the earlier centuries. Fogel (1989:2) testified, that „the 
famines that plagued England between 1500 and 1800 were man-made”: a consequence of insufficient 
information and counterproductive decisions, resulting „ failures in the system of food distribution related to an 
extremely inelastic demand for food inventories, rather than to natural calamities or inadequate technology.” 
Bisman (2012) could show the alchemy of pro domo decision making using a “unique budget document of the 
sixteenth century prepared for the Crown to facilitate decision-making and resource (re)allocation via the 
market in a period of dearth” coping with the East Anglian Famine of 1527–1528. “The budgetary procedure is 
detailed, together with discussion of the economic, political, and social contexts, and the significance of the 
Commissions as the foundation for subsequent developments in English public welfare policy. The document and 
policy of the commissions are critically evaluated as mechanisms of political and social control, which produced 
adverse behavioral responses and social outcomes”. 
5 They are tested “two competing arguments regarding the influence of organizational form on underwriting 
performance using data from the Swedish fire insurance industry for the years 1889 to 1939 – a period of both 
economic growth and stagnation. Since mutuality is a response to information asymmetry problems, mutual 
insurers are expected to report lower annual claims relative to premiums than stock insurance companies. 
However, an alternative view is that stock insurers seek to reduce information asymmetry problems by issuing 
non-participatory rights insurance contracts with high deductibles that induce risk-sharing between the insurer's 
shareholders and policyholders. This implies that stock insurers are likely to report lower annual claims than 
mutual insurers” (Adams et al, 2011).  
 From this broader perspective shaping prices purposefully is always a part of an 
overall, metacybernetic control mechanism, which regulates the full material metabolism of 
interconnected people as social macrosystem,6 governing through hidden imperatives, derived 
from future planning and risk reducing priorities. The scene is always coopetitive. On the 
individual level we see the patterns of competitive behavior, on the system (group) level we 
can recognize the patterns of cooperation and collaboration. So, the nature of information 
flow is also double-faced:  it can polarize the competition through generating individual 
information advantages, but at the same time serves as a tool of co-cognition, supporting 
dissemination of meanings, based on mutual interests.7   
In the 19th century the locally limited exchange transactions have been enabled by 
incidentally allocated prices of the selected goods, supporting directed actions, while creating 
a microcosm of price-information opened new ways to represent the world, enhancing the 
adaptation fitness of various actors to the new system level in its emergent phase. James R. 
Beniger could superbly reconstruct the chronological and structural changes in the first aspect, 
but there are lot of challenges to put into shape a colorful and well documented picture of the 
second one.    
 
Summary. Five theses 
 
“Anthropology moved from state-centric politics to wider and contradictory realms of 
configurations of power, and the ways in which power works out day-by-day. A perspective 
on power entails a privileged ethnographic focus on everyday differentiation, contradiction 
and struggle in the making of social organization” - writes Escalona Victoria (2016:249). He 
defines power relations “as differential capacities and strategies to make society, in a range 
of mutually constituting scales and contexts … looking at the multiple ways in which power 
relationships are constructed, performed, established, resisted and criticized; and also the 
                                                 
6 As an explanatory principle, the ultimate reason in the system-level control crisis of the mid-19th century is not 
the acceleration of the speed of product and price information transfer, but the structural inability to quickly 
accommodate to the growing size of interconnected people in the terms of absolute number of population, the 
number of meaningful connections and the transactionally involved geographical areas.    
7 A price system and a regulated market is very similar to the automatization process. Zuboff (1985) coined a 
word, ’informate’ to describe the unique capacity in an automated environment to create “new opportunities for 
learning and therefore new contests over who would learn, how, and what”. The result of this learning sequence 
is a deeper knowledge on the system and accidental new epistemological surplus on the nature of interconnected 
entities. This informating power of a newly represented transaction environment was equally the same in the pre-
digital era. 
multiple forms of politics beyond the state (in private or personal life)”. (Escalona Victoria, 
2016:256) 
 Our considerations are matching with Escalona Victoria’s view.  
 
1. It’s time for a switchover, seceding from power relations, building theories upon 
power configurations  
2. The control patterns are more complex than revived in mainstream models 
3. It is suggested to use control mix/cascade instead of control structures  
 
In the context of “price ecosystems” and “price games” 
4. We should change the ultracompetitive framework, highlighting the coopetitive nature 
of the scene8 
5. Emerging production of price information (as a new class of goods) was a symptom of 
an emerging new system condition.  
 
                                                 
8 „anthropology should also be focused on different forms of the upsurge of social authority based on 
consensus,beyond and against domination” (Escalona Victoria, 2016:257). 
References: 
 
Adams, Mike – Lars-Fredrik, Andersson – Joy, Yihui Jia, and Magnus Lindmark (2011): 
Mutuality as a Control for Information Asymmetry: A Historical Analysis of the  
Claims Experience of Mutual and Stock Fire Insurance Companies in Sweden,  
1889 to 1939 Business History 53:1074-1091.  
Beniger, James R. (1986): The Control Revolution. The Technological and Economic Origins 
of the Information Society Harvard University Press  
Bisman, Jane E. (2012): Budgeting for Famine in Tudor England, 1527–1528: Social and  
Policy Perspectives Accounting History Review 22:105-126.  
Brock, Gerald W. (2003): The second information revolution Harvard University Press 
Demsetz, Harold 1997: The Firm in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution The American 
Economic Review 2:426-429. 
Escalona Victoria, Jose Luis (2016): Anthropology of power: Beyond state-centric politics 
Anthropological Theory Vol. 16. (2–3) 249–262 
Fogel, Robert W. (1989): Second thoughts on the European Escape from Hunger: Famines, 
Price elasticities, entitlements, chronic malnutrition, and mortality rates National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper No.1. Cambridge, MA.  
Uebele, Martin – Grünebaum, Tim and Kopsidis, Michael (2013): King's law and food 
storage in Saxony, c. 1790-1830 CQE Working Papers 2613, Center for Quantitative 
Economics (CQE), University of Muenster. 
Woodman, Harold D. (1968): King Cotton and His Retainers: Financing and Marketing the 
Cotton Crop of the South 1800-1925 Lexington, University of Kentucky Press 
Zuboff, Shoshana (1985): Automate/Informate: The Two Faces of Intelligent Technology 
Organizational Dynamics 2: 5–18. 
 
